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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRED Y. OY.AllA, a Minor,
etc., et aI., Appellants.
(1] Alieu--.PropeJ1J &ichta.-The state baa the righ' to regulate
the tenure and disposition of real property within ita boundaries. It also baa the power, in the absence of a treat, to the
contrary, to forbid 'he taking or holding of property within
its limits by aliens.
(2] Id.-Alien Land Law-Validit7.-The Alien Land Law (Sta's.
1921, p. lxuili, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Lawa, Act 261),
letting up eligibility to citiJ:enship as a primary etandard, does
Dot amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority because the determination of some fact or condition
incorporated in this primary standard rests elsewhere than
in the Legislature, or because this requirement is measured by
another standard not under the control of the state and which
may be subject to change.
[3] Id.-Alien Land Law-Conve:yances to Ohfldren of Aliens.A citizen is not denied any constitutional guarantees because
his father, an ineligible alien, for the purpose of evading the
Alien Land Law, attempted to pass title to him. The land.
having escheated. to the state instanter, the eitizen BOD ae- i
quired nothing by the conveyance and the Alien Land Law
took nothing from him.
[4] ld.-Alien Land Law-Bscheat-Bvidence.-In a proceeding
to escheat land for violation of the Alien Land Law, the trial I
court's flnclings in regard to the 'Violation of the statute were •
supported by evidence that an ineligible alien purchased land

I

[1] See 1 OaLJnr. 927; 2 Am.Jnr. 476.
,
[4] See 1 OaJ.lm. IO-Yr. Supp. 207.
Kelt. Dig. &eferenees: [1] Aliens, 123; [2] Aliens, 137; [31 '
Aliens, § 43; [4, 6, 7, 8] Aliens, 154; [6] Aliens, 112.
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and OODveyed it to his minor 8On, a Dative-bora eitizen of the
United States; that a tenant of the lanel bew that the pr0perty belouged to the 8011, and the father W&8 1'1111ning the
boy's business, but did not bow whether eheeb payiug the
rent in the SOIl'S name, by whieb the tenaDt had also ]mown
the father, were made out to the "old IIWl or the JODDg fellow"; and that the fAther failed to fl.le 1"8ports required of
.. gaardian.
(6) I4.-a'amraliaation.-The 1942 ameudment of the Naturalization A.ot (66 State. 182; 8 U.S.C.L 11001), permittiag the
Daturaliza.tion of every person who honorably served ba the
armed forces of the United States duriDg t}1e present war
regarc11_ of rue, did not eliminate the 'basie nqui:rementa
for naturalization nor make eUgr"ble for eitizeDSbip rrery
Japanese national
(8] IcL-Alien x..nd Law-Blcheat.-Where land autolDAtioally
eacheated to the state for ~olation of the Alien Laud Law
aDd title then vested in the atate, nbsequent ehangee ba the
reqni1"8ments for naturalization had no effect on that· title.
[7] lei. - Alien Land Law-Bscheat-LimitatiODl.-A proeeec1ing
to escheat land for violation of the Alieu .Land Law is not
to be barred by any of the statutes of limitations generally
applicable to civil actions, because the provisions of the maetment are inconsistent with a statute of limitations aDd because
that intent is shown by the 1945 amendment speeiftoally deolariDg that no stRtute of limitations Khan apply to neb proeeeding.

[8] Id. - Alien Land Law - Bacheat - Laches.-A proceediDg to
eacheat laDd for violation of the Alien Land Law W&8 Dot
barred On the ground of laches where nO evidence was presented tencliDg to prove that aDy injury resulted to clefeDdaDta by reason of the lapee of time whieb oeeurrecl before
tbe commencement of the proeeeding.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of
San Diego County. Joe L. Shell, Judge. A1Brmed.
Proceeding to escheat land. Judgment for plaintiff afBrmed.
Wirin, Maeno & Tietz, A. L. Wirin and Saburo JUdo

and Fred Okrand for Appellants.
Daniel G. MMaha1l, Sherwood Green, Karlin H. Shirley,
Wayne M. Oollins, Arthur Garfield Hays, Oswald K. Fraen-

k~

James C. Purcell and William B. Ferriter

Curiae on behalf of
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Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Everett W. Mattoon, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas Whelan, District
Attorney (San Diego), and Duane J. Carnes, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
Cllester E. Watson, District Attorney (San Joaquin), and
Robert P. Sullivan, Chief Deputy District Attorney as l
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
I·
EDMONDS, J.-Principally upon the ground that the
United States Supreme Court has changed the constitutional tests applicable to state legislation such as the Alien
Land Law (Alien Property Initiative Act of 1920, Stats.
1921, p. lxxxiii, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
261 J. the validity of that statute is again challenged. Another question presented for decision concerns the effect
of the recent amendment of the federal law which allows,
under certain circumstances, a member of the Japanese
race to become a citizen of the United States.
In the petition filed by the attorney general, he asserted
that certain real property, by reason of its conveyance in
violation of the Alien Land Law, has escheated to the state..
Two causes of action were pleaded. In the first one, it was
alleged that Kajiro Oyama. Kohide Oyama, formerly Kohide
Kushino, and Ririchi Kushino, are of the Japanese race, natives of the Empire of Japan and citizens and subjects of
that country and, by reason thereof, are not eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States; that Fred Y.
Oyama is the son of Kajiro and Kohide Oyama and is of the
Japanese race but was born in California in 1928; and that
June Kushino also is of the Japanese race and was born in
California in 1921. There has never been a treaty permitting
a native of Japan to acquire an interest in the agricultural
land of this country. Since 1935, by appointment of the
Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the
County of San Diego. Kajiro Oyama has been the duly qualitied guardian of the person and estate of Fred Y. Oyama, i
a minor. June Kushino attained the age of 21 years in 1942 i
and during her minority, Ririchi Kushino was the guardian;
of her person and estate.
i
In 1934, the petition continued, Kajiro Oyama and Kohide '
Oyama purchased certain agricultural land in San Diego
County and a purported conveyance of it was made by one
!
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Yonezo Oyama to Fred Y. Oyama. The purchase price of
$4,000 was paid to Yonezo Oyama by Kajiro and Kohide
Oyama. Upon the execution and delivery of this purported
deed, Kajiro and Kohide Oyama entered into the possession
of the property and have ever since occupied and cultivated
it as their own, and have had in their own right the beneficial
use and enjoyment of the lands for agricultural purposes.
The purchase of the property and the taking of the deed in
the name of Fred Y. Oyama was a mere mlbterfuge, a fraud
upon the People of the State of California and a violation of
the Alien Land Law of California. Moreover, these persons
acted willfully, knowingly and with intent to obtain the ownership and use of the agricultural lands for their own use.
Other allegations of this count were that Kajiro Oyama
failed to render any account to the superior court for hi'! receipts and expenditures as guardian, and has not filed any
annual or other account or report with the Secretary of State
of California, as required by section 5 of the Alien Land Law.
No account or report has been filed by the guardian with the
County Clerk of San Diego County or Rerved upon the district
attorney, but in conducting business aifecting the land in
controversy, Kajiro Oyama used the name "Fred Oyama"
and "Y. Oyama," and maintained checking aecounts in each
of those names for the purpose of evading and violating
the Alien Land Law.
The second cause of action incorporated some of the allegations of the first count, including those having to do with
the race, nativity, citizenship and status of the parties. It
then pleaded that in 1937, the Superior Court of the State
of California, in and for the County of San Diego, in the
matter of the Guardianship of June Kushino, made an order
confirming the sale of certain described land in that county
from her to Fred Y. Oyama for a purchase price of $1,500.
Upon the making and recording of that order. Kajiro and
Kohide Oyama entered into possession of the property and
have since occupied and used it as their own and have had in
their own right the beneficial use of the land for agricultural
purposes. All of these acts were done by Kajiro and Kohide
Oyama, willfully, knowingly and with intent to violate the
Alien Land Law of the State of California. The prayer of
the petition was that the land conveyed to Fred Y. Oyama
be decreed to have eseheated to the state as of the date of the

)
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respective deeds; also that, as against the state, eaeh of
the defendants be forever barred from asserting any claim
or title to either parcel.
The defendants demurred to the petition upon the
grounds that it did not state facts sumcient to state a
cause of action, that the court laeked jurisdiction, that
the California Alien Land Law is unconstitutional, and
that the causes of action are barred by the statutes of limitatioIl8. The demurrer was overruled.
By &Il8wer, the defendants admitted the race and Japanese
citizeIl8hip of Kajiro Oyama, Kohide Oyama, and Ririchi
Kushino, but denied that, by reason thereof, they are not
eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States.
They admitted the pleaded facts as to the birth and race of
Fred Y. Oyama and .June Kushino, and also the allegatioIl8
concerning the guardianship proceedings. But the answer
denied that Kajiro and Kohide Oyama purehased the property described in the complaint and asserted that Kajiro
Oyama provided the money to purchase the two parcels of
property as a gift to his son. Each of the traIl8&ctioIl8 was
made in good faith and for the purpose of acquiring for their
son a means of earning a livelihood and for the further purpose of guarding and husbanding the gift for that purpose.
The property described in the complaint is agricultural land,
but Kajiro and Kohide Oyama have not occupied, used or
eultivated it &R their own nor had the beneficial use of it.
As an affirmative defense. the defendants alleged that the
state should not recover because of laches.
Upon the trial of these issues. John C. Kurfurst was the
only witness. He testified that he had known the Oyama and
Kushino families since about 1932. When the Japanese were
evacuated from the Pacific coast, he rented the land in controversy and. by two eheeks, paid the rent to Fred Oyama.
These cheeks were returned to him endorsed in that name.
Kurfurst had never heard the name Kajiro Oyama; he had
always known the father of the family as "Fred" and stated
that "everybody else called him Fred." But he had received
a letter signed "Fred Oyama" notifying him that the property was being turned over to a Mr. Kelly although Kurfurst
had never heard the writer refer to himself by that name.
Other testimony of Kurfurst was that at one time Oyama,
senior, said: "Some day the boy will have a good piece of
property because that is going to be valuable." However, he

I
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admitted that in a letter which he wrote, in referring to "Fred
Yoshihiro Oyama," he meant the son and not the father. Be
knew that the property belonged to the boy, Fred Oyama, and
to June Kushino; also that the father was running the boy's
business. But he did not know whether the checks were made
out to the "old man or the young fellow" and he did not
know "whether the boy signed it or Mr. Oyama."
Evidence of official record!! showed that no reports pursuant to the requirements of the Alien Land Law had been filed
by the defendants. The mate also proved that in the guardianship proceeding, on two occasions. the father of Fred Y.
Oyama, as guardian. applied for leave of court to borrow
money and to mortgage the property as security for the indehtedness. Both applicatioM were granted.
Upon this evidence the court found all of the facts alleged
in the petition to be true. The conclusion of law drawn
from these facts were that, as of 1934 and 1937. respectively,
title to the two parcelR of real property in question was vested
in and did escheat to the State of CaHfomia and the defendants were perpetually enjoined from setting up or making
any claim to the land. The appeal is from that judgment.
The defendants contend that the Alien Land Law is unconstitutional because enacted for the purpose of and administered in a manner to discriminate against persons solely
because of race. It iR urged that lUI to both Kajiro Oyama,
an alien. and Fred Oyama. a citizen, the statute denies due
process of law as guaranteed by article I. ReCtion 13, of the
California Constitution, and violateA article I, section 1. of
the same Constitution which troarantees to all men the right
to enjoy life, liberty and property. The point is also urged
that the Alien Land Law constitut~ an unlawful delegation
of legislative power to the federal government, and that the
phrase. "ineligible to citizenship" is vague, indefinite and
constitutes a denial of due process.
As to Fred Oyama, a citizen, it is argued that the Alien
Land Law violates the mandate of the California Constitution
that no citizen or claaR of citizen!! Rhall be "granted privileges
or immunities which. upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens." (Const., art. I, § 21.) Considering
the statute in its application to both Kajiro and Fred Oyama,
the defendants continue, it deprive"! them of property without
due process of law and denies them equal protection of the
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laws and deprives Fred Oyama of privileges and immunities
as a citizen, all in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. Counsel also contend
that, although the Alien Land Law has been upheld, the
United States Supreme Court has changed the constitutional
test applicable to state legislation discriminating against a
group and its members because of raee from the "rational
basis" doctrine to that of "clear and present danger." A decision approving a statute does not bar a contrary determination
at another time and under a dllferent set of circumstances.
Furthermore, by virtue of a recent amendment to the Naturalization Act, persons of Japanese birth no longer are ineligible to citizenship solely because of raee, and the Alien
Land Law is inapplicable to Kajiro Oyama because, if he
joins the Army, he may become a citizen.
The defendants also rely upon the statutes of limitations.
As they state the rights of the parties, by section 312 of the
Code of Civil Procedure all actions are barred by some statute
of limitations and the state's claims are barred by the I-year,
the 3-year, the 4-year and the 10-year statutes of limitations.
More specifically, the present suit comes within section 340
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 338, subdivision 1
of the same code also is applicable because this is an "action
upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or
forfeiture." Moreover, section 338, subdivision 4, of the Code
of Civil Procedure bars the remedy sinee the effect of the
judgment is that the defendants acted fraudulently. Section
343 also applies, and the broad provisions of section 315 of
the same code include an escheat action. In conclusion, it is
contended that the doctrine of laches is applicable to each
cause of action. Two amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of
appellants develop in more detail the principal contentions
in regard to the bar of the statutes of limitations.
The attorney general stands upon the decision of this court
and that of the United States Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of the Alien Land Law as a proper exercise
of the state's police power. It has been the invariable policy
of the United States, he declares, to discriminate against aliens
by racial classification for purposes of immigration and naturalization. There is a rational basis for discrimination, and
the distinction between eligible and ineligible aliens is made
by federal, not state, statutes. Moreover, the test of a "clear
and present danger" is limited to fundamental eivil liberties
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and not to property rights and no evidence was presented
establishing unconstitutional discrimination. The recent
amendment to the naturalization laws does not abolish ineligibility to citizenship of aliens regardless of race, as the
defendants contend, but only extends the privilege of naturalization to those serving honorably in the armed forces during
World War TI. Furthermore, since title to the property vested
in the State of California long prior to the act of Congress
attempted to be relied upon by the defendants, the later
legislation can have no effect upon the state's title.
In regard to the statutes of limitations, the state contends
that section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the recovery of real property and there is neither
a forfeiture nor the imposition of a penalty under the Alien
Land Law. Section 338, subdivision I, does not apply, because no question of "liability" is involved. Subdivision 4
of the same section deals with actions based upon fraud,
which is only an incidental issue in the present suit; the gist
of the action is that the state claims to have title to land and
the defendants are asserting unfounded claims to it. As to
section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the bar of that
statute was not raised by the pleadings and it has no application to an escheat proceeding.
Considering section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the attorney genera) takes the position that although there
is no express language in the Alien Land Law which excepts its requirements from the operation of other provisions of law, the plain policy of the enactment is wholly
inconsistent with the application of a statute of limitations
and the Legislature has so declared in a 1945 amendment
to the statute. And because there is no showing of any injury by the delay, the doctrine of laches is not applicable,
and the finding upon that issue is beyond the reach of an
appellate court. The amicus curiae brief rued upon behalf
of the state presents substantialIy the same arguments as
those advanced by the attorney general.
The Alien Land Law legislates concerning the right to own
land in this state. The scope of the statute is much broader
than the acquisition and ownership of land; it includes the
right to "acquire, possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real property ... [or to] ... have
in whole or in part the beneficial use thereof." (§§ 1, 2.)

)
172

PEOPLE

v.

OVAlU

r29C.2d

This right is given to citizens of the United States and to all
aliens eligible to become such; aliens who are not eligible to
citizenship under the laws of the United States can enjoy
the right only in the manner and to the extent and for the
purposes prescribed by any treaty existing at the time of the
enactment of the statute between the government of the
United States and the nation or country of which the alien
ia a citizen or subject. (§I 1, 2.) Semon 4 of the statute,
88 origiDally enacted, denied to an alien parent the right to
become the guardian of the state of his Dative-born chUd
and was held invalid. (Briots of YOM, 188 Cat 645 [206
P. 995].) However, in 1943, the Legislature amended that ,.
section, allowing the appointment of an alien guardian but ,';
preventing such guardian from enjoying, either directly or .~
indirectly, the beneficial use of land owned by the minor. '~
The new provision requires the guardian to make an annual i
report to the court showing all moneys expended and received, and to serve a copy of such report upon the district
attorney of the county, together with notice of the hearing"
of the report. Failure to do 80 renders the guardian punishable by he, imprisonment, or both.
Section 5 directs the guardian to file in the office of the :1
secretary of state, and in the office of the county clerk of .~
each
in which
any property
reportcounty
describing
"property
• • • held is
bysituated,
him • • •an
on annual
behalf
of such alien or minor; . . • the date when each item of such
property came into his possession or control; An itemized.
account of all such expenditures, investments, rents, issue.'l
and profits in respect to the administration and control of ,i
such property with particular reference to holdings of corporate stock and leases • . • and other agreements in respect
to land and the handling or sale of products thereof." Violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment, fine
or both.
Section 7 of the statute, 88 amended in 1923, states that ;1
real property acquired in violation of the act by an ineligibJe "
alien "shall escheat 88 of the date of such acquiring, to, and ".\'
become and remain the property of the state of California.", ,
Section 8.5, added in 1945, provides: "No statute of limits- ~
tiODS shall apply or operate as a bar to any escheat aetion or
_~
proceeding now pending or hereafter commenced PUl'Sll&llt
to the provisions of this act." As a part of the same enactment, the Legislature declared that it .cdoes not constitute a
;1.:':'

,

"

)
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change in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law." (Stats.
1945, ch. 1136.)
By other provisions of the legislation, where the property
interest attempted to be transferred is of such character
that the ineligible alien "is inhibited from acquiring, possessing, enjoying, using, cultivating, occupying, transferring,
transmitting or inheriting it," and if the conveyance is made
"with intent to prevent, evade or avoid escheat," the "transfer of real property, or of an interest therein, though colorable in form, shall be void as to the State and the interest
thereby conveyed as sought to be conveyed ahall escheat to
the State as of the date of such transfer." (§ 9.) By the
terms of the same section, a prima facie presumption that
the conveyance is made with such intent shall arise upon
proof of: "(a) The taking of the property in the name of a
person other than the persons mentioned in Section two
hereof if the consideration is paid or agreed or understood to
be paid by an alien mentioned in Section two hereof. • • ."
The determination as to eligibility to citizenship rests
exclusively with the federal government and is fixed by
Congress in the naturalization laws. Whomever it endows
with the right to become a citizen may acquire and own
land in California.
Eligibility has been extended to "white persons, persons
of Mriean nativity or descent, descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere, and Chinese persons or
persons of Chinese descent" and includes native-born Filipinos having honorable service in our armed forces and
former citizens who are otherwise eligible. (57 Stats. 601,
8 U.S.C.A. § 703.) In 1942, the Naturalization A~ was
amended (56 Stats. 182, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1001) to extend the
privilege of naturalization to include "any person not a
citizen, regardless of age, who has served or hereafter serves
honorably in the military or Daval forces of the United
States during the present war and who shall have been at
the time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof
and who (a) was lawfully admitted into the United States,
including its Territories and possessions, or (b) having entered the United States . • • prior to September 1, 1943,
being unable to establish lawful admission into the United
States serves honorably in such forces beyond the continental limits of the United States or has 80 served. •••"
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[1] The state has the right to regulate the tenure and
disposition of real property within its boundaries. (Mott v.
Cline, 200 Cal. 434 [253 P. 718]; Blythe v. Hinckley, 127
Cal. 431 (59 P. 787]; Terrace v. Thompson,263 U.S. 197
[44 S.Ot. 15, 68 L.Ed. 2551; United States v. Foz, 94 U.S.
315 [24 L.Ed. 1921.) It also has the power, in the absence of
a treaty to the contrary, to forbid the taking or holding of
property within its limits by aliens (Mott v. Cline, supra, p.
447; In re Y. Akado, 188 Cal. 739, 743 [207 P. 245J; Blythe
v. Hinckley, 81£pra, p. 436; Terrace v. Thompson, tupra, p.
217) and our Constitution leaves to the Legislature this
power with regard to all aliens ineligible to eitizenship.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 17; In re Y. Akado, tupra, p. 743.)
The Alien Land Law expressly honors every right vouchsafed by a treaty between this and another nation. In all
cases where the right to own land in the United States by
citizens of a foreign nation is granted by treaty, such right
is recognized and fully protected. (§ 2.) "The treaty between the United States and Japan provides that citizens
of Japan residing in the United States may lease land for
residential and commercial purposes, but it contains no provision authorizing an alien of the Japanese race to lease or
acquire land for agricultural purposes. Consequently the
initiative alien law . . . prohibits the acquisition by such
alien of any agricultural land situated in this state." (In re
Y. Akado, supra, p. 740; see, also, Terrace v. Thompson,
supra, p. 223; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 232 [44
S.Ct. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278].) The abrogation of this treaty on
January 26, 1940, has no effect upon the rights of the parties in the present litigation.
Shortly after the People enacted the Alien Land Law••
suit was brought to enjoin the attorney general from enforcing its provisions. The plaintiffs complained that they
had been "unlawfully coerced by • • • threats of prosecution
from entering into . . . agreements [pertaining to the planting. cultivating, and farming of certain agricultural lands]
and . . . thereby deprived of their property without due
process of law and . . . denied equal protection of the law
in contravention to the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution." It was held that the legislation does not
"offend any clause or provision of the state or federal constitution or violate any treaty obligation or right existing between this country and the empire of Japan." .AB to the
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validity of certain cropping contracts, the court said, quoting from Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 [44 S.Ct. 112, 68
L.Ed. 318] : "Conceivably, by the use of sueb contract, the
population living on and cultivating the fann lands might
come to be made up largely of ineligible aliens. The allegiance
of the farmers to the state directly affects its strength and
safety. (Terrace ef al. v. Thompson, supra.) We think it
within the power of the state to deny to ineligible aliens the
privilege so to use agricultural lands within its borders."
(porterfield v. Webb, 195 Cal. 71 [231 P. 554].)
The Webb v. O'Brien decision, it was pointed out in this
case, "rests largely upon broad principles of national safety
and public welfare. Unquestionably the farming of lands
by ineligible aliens would give them a use, occupancy, and
benefit of agricultural lands which in effect would amount
to a deprivation of its use, enjoyment and occupancy by the
citizen. Any other theory would be incompatible with the
occupation of husbandry. . . . Racial distinctions may furnish legitimate grounds for classifications under some conditions of social 01' governmental ne('e!'l.'lities." (195 Cal.
at p. 82.)
In the case of Mott v. Cline, supm, the owner-lessor challenged the validity of a certain option provision in a lease,
the contention being that the lessee was an ineligible alien.
.AB to the constitutionality of the statute, the court said:
"It has been firmly settled by the decisions of both federal
and state courts • • . that the adoption of the Alien Land
Acts was a lawful exercise of the police power. In fact, it
is the exereise of that power in its highest and truest sense.
The ownership of the soil by persons morally bound by obligations of citizenship is vital to the political existence of
a state. It directly affects its welfare and safety." (200
Cal. at p. 447.)
The status of aliens in conneetion with the ownership of
real property was also considered by the United States
Supreme Court in Terrace v. Thompson, supra. The court
. there pointed out that "two classes of aliens inevitably
resulted from the naturalization laws,-those wbo may and
those who may not become citizens. The rule established by
Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for elassification in a state law withholding
from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the
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act." Considering the eontention that an alien land law
aimilar to our own enacted by the State of Washington was
repugnant to the due process clause and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court declared:
"State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens,
withholding from them the right to own land, eannot be said
to be capricious, or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of
liberty or property, or to transgress the due process clause. It
Upon the subject of equal protection the court held that the
classi1ication was reasonable, saying that the rule established
by Congress on the subject of naturalization "in and of
itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for elassi1ication in a state
law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership
&I de1lned in the act." The broad basis of the decision hi that
"one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an
interest in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, 10 lacking, the state may rightfully
deny him the right to own and lease real estate within itR
boundaries." In another case, the California statute was
upheld upon these grounds, with the comment that both aets
were within the police power of the respective states. (Porterflsld v. Webb. 263 U.S. 255 [44 S.Ot. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278].)
Other federal court cases in which the constitutionality of
the Alien Land Law of California bas been considered
are: Morrison v. CoJiforrWs, 291 U.s. 82 [54 S.Ot. 281, 78
L.Ed. 664] (reversing People v. Morrison, 218 Cal. 287 [22
P.2d718), and declaring section 9a of the Alien Land Law
nnconstitutional); Cockrill v. CriUfomitJ., 268 U.S. 258 [45
S.Ot. 490. 69 L.Rd. 944] (sustaining constitutionality of
the presumption set forth in section 9, subd. (a), of the
Alien Land Law); Prick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 [44 S.Ot.
115, 68 L.Rd. 323].
The defendants rely upon Wut Virginia State BOGra 01
Educ.ation v. Bameffe, 319 U.S. 624 [63 S.Ot. 1178, 87 L.Ed.
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674], and 2'AomGI v. CoZZi,.", 323 U.S. 616
[65 S.Ot. 315, 89 L.Rd. 430], for the proposition tbat modern doctrines of constitutional law extend the protection of
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to
all eases where the Legislature cannot justiftably ftnd a "clear
and present danger" as a basis for restricting the liberty of
the individual. However, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for
the majority in the first of these eases, clearly distinguished
between the test to be used when dealing with fundamental
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liberties, whieh include freedoms of epeech, preas, assembly,
and worship, and other rights. He aaid: "In weighing. arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those eases in which it is applied for its own uke.
The teat of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of
the First, is mueh moredeftnite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Mueh of the vagueness of the due
process clause disappears when the speei1ic prohibitiODR of
the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may weII include, 80 far as
the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions whieh a legislature may have a 'rational basis'
for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of preas, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on sueh alender
grounds. They are susceptible of restrietion only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State
may lawfully protect. It is important to .note that while it
is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears direetly upon the
State it is the more speei1ic limiting principles of the First
Amendment that 1lnaI1y govern this ease." (319 U.S. at p.
639.) And in the more recent ease of 2'AomGs v. Colli"",
.upm, Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority, made
clear that the "clear and present danger" teat Will be applied only to those fundamental libertieR protected by the
First Amendment. (See, also, Albuf"1l HolpiftJl V. OM.
Count", 326 U.S. 207 [66 S.Ot. 61, 90 L.Ed. 6]; CtJlifornill v. f'lwmp80n, 318 U.S. 109 [61 S.Ot. 930, 85 L.Ed.
1219]; (J/,(Jrk v. PGtil Gray, Inc., 806 U.S. 588 [59 S.Ot. 744,
88 L.Ed. l00l); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 [35
S.Ot. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385]; 38 CalL.Rev. 319.)
These eases and the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court previously cited, including f'emJU v. f'Mmp.Dn, aupro,
and Porterfield v. Webb, aupreJ, limit the teat ofa "clear and
present danger" to fundamental liberties and do not restrict
the authority of the state, under its police power, to limit the
rights of aliens in regard to real property situated within its
borders. It is su1Ileient if a rational basis is found for the
classification. And considering the Alien Land Law in connection with the record now before the eourt, there is no

.,

178

PEoPLE tI. OYAMA

[29 C.2d

evidence that the statute was unconstitutionally applied or
administered.
[2] The Legislature of this state has set up eligibility
to citizenship as a primary standard, and because the
determination of some fact or condition incorporated in
this primary standard rests elsewhere than in tbe Legislature, or this requirement is to be measured by another
standard not under the control of the state and which may
be subject to change, does not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. (Ez parle Gerino,
143 Cal. 412 [77 P. 166, 66 L.R.A. 249); In ,-e Lasswell, 1
Cal.App.2d 183 [36 P.2d 678], and cases cited therein;
People v. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277 [151 N.E. 452].} This
court and the United States Supreme Court in the cited
eases have held that the use of the phrase, "ineligible to
citizenship" does not constitute a denial of due process.
[8] The property in question passed to the State of
California by l'eason of deficiencies existing in the ineligible
alien, and not in the citizen Oyama. The citizen is not denied any constitutional guarantees because an ineligible
alien, for the purpose of evading the Alien Land Law, attempted to pass title to him. It is the deficiency of the alien
father and not of the citizen son which is the controlling
factor: therefore, any constitutional guarantees to which the
citizen Oyama is entitled may not properly be considered,
for the deficiency in a person other than himself is the cause
for the escheat. Property which the citizen never had he
could not lose, and as the land escheated to the state instanter. he acquired nothing by the conveyance and the
Alien l.Jand Law took nothing from him.
(4] The trial court's findings in regard to the violation
of the statute are fully supported by the evidence. The
inferences to be drawn from the evidence that the real
propert~· was conveyed to the son, thereby putting it beyond the power of the father to deal with the property
directly. the father's failure to file the reports required
of 8 guardian, the unexplained failure of the father, or any
one of the defendants, to offer himself as a witness, and the
presumption created by section 9 of the Alien Land Law,
are ample in this regard. Indeed, this evidence convincingly points to the conclusion that the minor son had no
interest in the property, his name being used only as a subterfuge for the purpose of evading the Alien Land Law.
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[5] The defendants also urge that by the 1942 amendment
to the Naturalization Act (56 Stats. 182, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1001),
permitting the naturalization of every person who honorably
served in the armed forces of the United States during the
present war. all ineligibility to naturalization based upon
race was removed. But the clear purpose of Congress in
granting that privilege to those persons who could not· otherwise become citizens was to reward military service. Certainly
the statute does not make eligible to citizenship every Japanese
national, and those who take advantage of its provisions
gain that sta~ because of work well done for our country
and not by reason of having the qualifications to join ita
armed forces. Following World War 1. the same privilege
was extended to Filipinos (40 Stats. 542, 8 U.S.C. § 388)
and it was held that the amendment did not eliminate the
basic requirements for naturalization; liaR to those not p0ssessing such qualifications. the distinction based on color
and race was not eliminated." (Roque Espiritu De La
v. United States. 77 F.2d 988; certiorari denied, 296 U.S.
575 [56 S.Ot. 138. 80 L.Ed. 406].) The statute relied upon
by the defendantll in the present ease has the same efteet.
[6] Another complete answer to the cont.ention of the de..
fendant~ in regard to the changes in the requirements for
naturalization is that, under the Alien Land Law, in 1934 the
land described in the first count of the complaintautomatically escheated to the state, and as to the property conveyed
by the estate of June Kushino, escheat occurred three years
later. Title vested in th(> state upon these dates, and the
later legislation bas no effect upon that title.
r'l] The defendants claim that the present proceeding is
barred by the provi.crions of one or more of the statutes of
limitation~ generally applicable to civil actions. Primarily,
thiR defense is based upon section 312 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides: "Civil actions, without exception. can only be commenced within the perio& prescribed
in this title. after the cause of action shall have aeerued.
unles~ where, in special eases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." But the plain meaning of this section
iR that the particular statutes of limitations which are found
in section 315. et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure may
be invoked except M to an action authorized by legislation
which includes a provision limiting the time within which it
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may be commenced. .And the "di1ferent limitation" mentioned in section 312 clearly should be construed to include
no limitation as to an action commenced under a 8ta.tute
which speei1ies that time shall not bar the right to invoke its
provisions.
The clear and unmistakable purpose of the Alien Land
Law at all times since it was enacted by the People as an
initiative measure has been to place the ownership of real
property in this state beyond the reach of an alien ineligible
to citizenship. Not only is such an alien prohibited from aequiring real property, or any interest therein; the 8ta.tute
expressly provides that he shall not possess, enjoy, use, eulti-vate or occupy land. He may DOt convey real property, or
any interest therein, or ha~ in whole or in part, the beneficial use of land, and any attempted transfer to an ine1egible alien is void as to the state. These provisions are
entirely inconsistent with a statute of limitations; they state
broad principles of public poliey relating to the ownership
of J4n,d and declare that any conveyance made in violation of the mandate of the People shall be void.
The Legislature of 1945 made this construction certain.
It declared: "No statute of limitations shall apply or operate as a bar to any escheat action or proceeding now pending or hereafter commenced pursuant to the provisions"
of the Alien Land Law. (§ 8.5.) "The amendment made
by this act does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law." (Stats. 1945, ch. 1136, § 2.)
It is entirely proper for the Legislature to clarify the
provisions of a statute in this manner, and for the court to
follow that construction. (Standard Oil Co. .... J O'hM()1f" 24
Cal.2d 40, 48 [147 P.2d 577]; Union, League Club v. Johfl.,()1f" 18 Cal.2d 275, 278-279 [115 P.2d 425].)
[8] In regard to the speeial defense of laches, the court
found that the action was not barred upon that ground. The
record shows that no evidence was presented tending to prove
that any injury resulted to the defendants by reason of the
lapse of time which occurred before the commencement of the
proceeding and the finding is amply justified. ( Ale:tander
v. State Capitcil Co., 9 Cal.2d 304, 313 [70 P.2d 6191; Batlagh .... WilZiaml, 50 Cal.App.2d 10, 13 [122 P.2d 343].)
The judgment is aftinned.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Schauer, J., eonea.rrec1.
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TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment on the cround
that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court cited
in the main opinion are controlling until such time as they
are reexamined and modUled by that eourt.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
25, 1946. Carter, J., TOted for a rehearing.
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